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The Chislenko premises I: physical interaction

I continue looking into the implied theory of ghosts in Reginald Hill’s short story “There are No Ghosts in the Soviet Union”. Now that we’ve dealt with the pseudoscientific psychobabble, caught up with the underlying metaphysics of persons, and outlined Chislenko’s reasoning, let’s look more deeply into the actual theory of ghosts it implies. 5. As we have seen, that theory has two components:...

A primer on disembodied egos

I continue looking into the implied theory of ghosts in Reginald Hill’s short story “There are No Ghosts in the Soviet Union”. Now that we’ve dealt with the pseudoscientific psychobabble, and outlined Chislenko’s reasoning, let’s look more deeply into the actual theory it implies. 4. In order to discuss the first premise we have to catch up on a bit of ontological background. For that, I’ll use...

Unpacking ghost-sighting reasoning

I continue looking into the implied theory of ghosts in Reginald Hill’s short story “There are No Ghosts in the Soviet Union”. Now that we’ve dealt with the pseudoscientific psychobabble, let’s go back to the actual theory of Chislenko’s that evolves. 3. Given the mantra that “there are no ghosts”, the task becomes the rather perverse proof of there being nothing the ghostly appearance could...

Fun with psychobabble jargon

I continue looking into the implied theory of ghosts in Reginald Hill’s short story “There are No Ghosts in the Soviet Union”. 2. Hill has some fun with “rational” explanations in the story. The character of Natasha provides the requisite psychobabbling turns of phrase: Perhaps I could dress it up for you. A para-psychological phenomenon, how would that sound in your report? Or perhaps you prefer...

Ghosts, and what needs to be there for them to be a ghost of

Here’s an interesting assumption: in order for there to be a ghost, there must first be someone (or something) for it to be a ghost of. Interesting, because in a situation where you’re trying to prove that a given episode, whatever it is, is not a ghost appearance, that would hardly be the first line of thought that comes to mind. You may think of many ways (typically involving rational...

Consolidation, ep. 1

I’m in the middle of a major rewrite of the ideas behind this blog, as a result of which I have integrated some of them into larger essays. (Over time, there will be more…) Note that this is mostly about collecting dispersed lines of argument, bringing them in order, filling some gaps, and making the texts more readable. The ideas themselves are beginning to emerge more clearly, too, and so in...

Momentary gods: objectification

Imagine the following scenario: you’re walking back home at night and pass through a dark alley; suddenly you see, a few steps ahead, an obscure figure lurking in a corner; you startle and freeze; you get somewhat frightened; for a second or two you’re certain there is a threatening presence over there, you’ll get mugged or worse …; and then you realize, with considerable relief, that it’s just...

Momentary gods: religious sensitivity

Usener famously theorized that the idea of a new god could, in ancient times, appear spontaneously anywhere in human dealings with their surroundings. All that was needed was that a person suddenly felt the touch of the divine, and religious sensitivity invested the moment with the notion of a newly created deity. In Usener’s picture, these momentarily generated deifications merely formed a proto...

The recurring circling that structures presentation

Unfortunately, the formulation “incessant circling” which I used to characterize Jung’s writing can be interpreted in multiple different ways. So let’s clarify. What I don’t mean are those many passages of “amplification” which we find in some of his works. Instead, I want to keep strictly to passages where Jung outlines his principal ideas.

Unreal time and memoria

I did a poor job, in two of my earlier posts (here and here), of explaining what I meant by the formulation “unreal time” in their titles. I meant it, of course, as an explication of something Durrell has his narrator say. But I should have made the connection clearer. 1. When Durrell’s narrator refers to time as something that characterizes the life of people in the city, he calls it calendar...

Leif Frenzel is a writer and independent researcher. He has a background in philosophy, literature, music, and information technology. His recent interest is Jungian psychology, especially synchronicities and the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious.

alchemy archetypes causality dark side death depth dreams ego eros erotetic arch film frame analysis ghost-story style ghosts individuals individuation Jung philology liminality literature magic methodology mirrors mystery mysticism Narcissus narrative analysis nekyia pathologizing persona personal note personification persons projection psychoid romantic love self-knowledge shadow soul space spirit subjectivity symbols synchronicities technology time